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Abstract
We examine the economic behavior of the regret-averse firm under price uncertainty.
We show that the global and marginal effects of price uncertainty on production
are both positive (negative) when regret aversion prevails if the random output
price is positively (negatively) skewed. In this case, high (low) output prices are
much more likely to be seen than low (high) output prices. To minimize regret,
the firm is induced to raise (lower) its output optimal level. The skewness of the
price distribution as such plays a pivotal role in determining the regret-averse firm’s
production decision.
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1. Introduction
There is ample evidence that individuals and firms have desires to avoid adverse conse-
quences arising from their ex-ante optimal decisions that turn out to be ex-post suboptimal
(Loomes, 1988; Loomes et al., 1992; Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Starmer and Sugden, 1993).
To reconcile these pervasive regret-averse preferences, Bell (1982, 1983) and Loomes and
Sugden (1982) develop regret theory that defines regret as the disutility arising from not
having chosen the ex-post optimal alternative. An axiomatic foundation of regret theory is
later offered by Quiggin (1994) and Sugden (1993).
In a recent article, Broll et al. (2016) has incorporated regret theory into Sandmo’s
(1971) model of the competitive firm under price uncertainty. The firm’s regret-averse
preferences are characterized by a bivariate utility function that includes additive separable
disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives.0 The extent of regret is
gauged by the difference between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by
making the optimal production decision had the firm observed the true realized output
price. Broll et al. (2016) derives a sufficient condition under which the regret-averse firm
optimally produces less when the output price becomes uncertain. As an extension, Niu et
al. (2014) derive an alternative sufficient condition for such a negative global effect of price
uncertainty on production.
In this study, we revisit Broll et al. (2014) model by examining not only the global
effect but also the marginal effect of changes in price uncertainty on production. We show
that both effects are positive (negative) if the random output price is positively (negatively)
skewed. In this case, high (low) output prices are much more likely to be seen than low
(high) output prices. To minimize regret, the firm is induced to raise (lower) its optimal
output level. We as such show that the skewness of the price distribution plays a pivotal
0Other applications of regret theory include Braun and Muermann (2004), Guo et al. (2015), Muermann
et al. (2006), and Wong (2012, 2015).
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role in determining the regret-averse firm’s production decision, which is a novel result in
the literature.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates a model of the regret-
averse competitive firm under price uncertainty. Section 3 examines the global effect of
price uncertainty on production. Section 4 examines the marginal effect of changes in price
uncertainty on production. The final section concludes.
2. The model
Consider the competitive firm under price uncertainty a` la Sandmo (1971). There is one
period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the firm produces a single commodity according
to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and C(Q) is
compounded to date 1 with the properties that C(0) = C ′(0) = 0, and C ′(Q) > 0 and
C ′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0. The strict convexity of C(Q) reflects the fact that the firm’s
production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
At date 1, the firm sells the entirety of its output, Q, at the then prevailing per-unit price,
P˜ , which is unknown ex ante.1 The uncertain per-unit price, P˜ , is distributed according
to a known cumulative distribution function (CDF), F (P ), over support [P , P ], where
0 < P < P . The firm’s profit at date 1 as a function of P is, therefore, given by
Π(P ) = PQ− C(Q), (1)
for all P ∈ [P , P ].
Following the literature, we assume that the firm’s preferences are represented by the
following bivariate utility function:
V (Π, R) = U(Π)− βG(R), (2)
1Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
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where U(Π) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0
for all Π > 0, β is a positive constant, and G(R) is a regret function defined over the
magnitude of regret, R, such that G(0) = 0, and G′(R) > 0 and G′′(R) > 0 for all R > 0.2
The magnitude of regret, R = Πmax − Π, is gauged by the difference between the actual
profit, Π, and the maximum profit, Πmax, that the firm could have earned at date 1 should
the firm have made the optimal production decision based on knowing the true per-unit
price, P . Since Π cannot exceed Πmax, the firm experiences disutility from forgoing the
possibility of undertaking the ex-post optimal production decision. The parameter, β, is
a constant regret coefficient that reflects the increasing importance of regret aversion in
representing the firm’s preferences as β increases.
To characterize the regret-averse firm’s optimal production decision, we have to first
determine the maximum profit, Πmax, at date 1. If the firm could have observed the true
per-unit price, P , the maximum profit at date 1 would be achieved if the firm had chosen
Q(P ), which is the solution to C ′[Q(P )] = P . The maximum profit at date 1 as a function
of P is, therefore, given by
Πmax(P ) = PQ(P )− C[Q(P )], (3)
for all P ∈ [P , P ]. Using Eqs. (1) and (3), we can write the magnitude of regret, R(P ), as
R(P ) = Πmax(P )−Π(P ) = PQ(P )− C[Q(P )]− [PQ− C(Q)], (4)
for all P ∈ [P , P ].
We can now state the regret-averse firm’s ex-ante decision problem. At date 0, the firm
chooses an output level, Q, so as to maximize the expected value of the bivariate utility
function defined in Eq. (2):
max
Q≥0
E{U [Π(P˜ )]− βG[R(P˜ )]}, (5)
2Bleichrodt et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that regret functions are indeed convex.
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where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the CDF of P˜ , and Π(P ) and R(P )
are given by Eqs. (1) and (4), respectively. The first-order condition for program (5) is
given by
E
{
{U ′[Π∗(P˜ )] + βG′[R∗(P˜ )]}[P˜ − C ′(Q∗)]
}
= 0, (6)
where an asterisk (∗) signifies an optimal level.
Differentiating the objective function of program (5) twice with respect to Q yields
E
{
{U ′′[Π(P˜ )]− βG′′[R(P˜ )]}[P˜ − C ′(Q)]2 − {U ′[Π(P˜ )] + βG′[R(P˜ )]}C ′′(Q)
}
< 0, (7)
for all Q > 0, where the inequality follows from the properties of U(Π), G(R), and C(Q).
Eq. (7) implies that Eq. (6) is both necessary and sufficient for Q∗ to be the unique optimal
solution to program (5).
3. The global effect of price uncertainty
As a benchmark, we consider the case wherein the uncertain per-unit price, P˜ , is fixed
at its expected value, E(P˜ ). In this benchmark case of certainty, Eq. (6) reduces to
C ′(Q◦) = E(P˜ ), where Q◦ is the optimal output level under certainty. This is the usual
optimality condition under which the marginal cost of production is equated to the expected
per-unit price.
To examine the global effect of price uncertainty on the firm’s production decision, we
compare Q∗ with Q◦. To this end, we first consider the case that the firm is risk neutral
and regret averse, i.e., U(Π) = Π and G′′(R) > 0. Differentiating the objective function of
program (5) with U(Π) = Π with respect to Q, and evaluating the resulting the derivative
at Q = Q◦ yields
βE{G′[R◦(P˜ )][P˜ − E(P˜ )]} = βCov{G′[R◦(P˜ )], P˜}, (8)
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where we have used the fact that C ′(Q◦) = E(P˜ ), and Cov(·, ·) is the covariance operator
with respect to the CDF of P˜ .3 It then follows from Eqs. (6) and (7) that Q∗ > (<) Q◦
if, and only if, the covariance term on the right-hand side of Eq. (8) is positive (negative).
We state and prove our first proposition.
Proposition 1. The regret-averse, but risk-neutral, competitive firm increases or de-
creases its optimal output level, i.e., Q∗ is greater or smaller than Q◦, when the per-unit
price becomes uncertain, depending on whether E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} is no less than G′[R◦(P )] or
G′[R◦(P )], respectively.
Proof. Note that
∂G′[R◦(P )]
∂P
= G′′[R◦(P )][Q(P )−Q◦]. (9)
Since Q′(P ) = 1/C ′′[Q(P )] > 0 and Q[E(P˜ )] = Q◦, it follows from Eq. (9) and G′′(R) > 0
that G′[R◦(P )] is decreasing (increasing) in P for all P < (>) E(P˜ ). Hence, G′[R◦(P )] is
U-shaped and reaches a unique minimum at P = E(P˜ ). If E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≥ G′[R◦(P )], there
must exist a unique per-unit price, P ◦ ∈ (E(P˜ ), P ), such that G′[R◦(P ◦)] = E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]}.
Since G′[R◦(P )] is U-shaped and E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≥ G′[R◦(P )], it follows that G′[R◦(P )] <
E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} for all P ∈ (P , P ◦) and G′[R◦(P )] > E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} for all P ∈ (P ◦, P ].
Hence, we have
Cov{G′[R◦(P˜ )], P˜} = E
{{
G′[R◦(P˜ )]− E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]}
}
(P˜ − P ◦)
}
> 0. (10)
Eq. (10) then implies that Q∗ > Q◦. The proof that Q∗ < Q◦ if E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≥ G′[R◦(P )]
can be done analogously and thus is omitted. 2
To see the validity of the condition that E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} can be no less than G′[R◦(P )]
or G′[R◦(P )], we consider the case that P˜ is a binary random variable such that P˜ is
3For any two random variables, X˜ and Y˜ , we have Cov(X˜, Y˜ ) = E(X˜Y˜ )− E(X˜)E(Y˜ ).
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equal to either P or P with probability p or 1 − p, respectively. In this binary example,
E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} > (<) G′[R◦(P )] if, and only if, R◦(P ) < (>) R◦(P ). To be more concrete,
we assume that the cost function is quadratic, C(Q) = cQ2, where c is a positive constant.
Then, we have Q(P ) = P/2c and R◦(P ) = [P − E(P˜ )]2/4c. In this case, we have R◦(P ) <
(>) R◦(P ), thereby Q∗ > (<) Q◦, if, and only if, p > (<) 1/2.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. If E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≥ G′[R◦(P )], it follows
from Eq. (10) that G′[R◦(P˜ )] is positively correlated with P˜ . Introducing regret aversion
to the firm makes the firm raise more concerns about the disutility from the discrepancy of
its output level, Q(P )−Q◦, when high realizations of P˜ are revealed. To minimize regret,
the regret-averse firm optimally adjusts its output level upward from Q◦ so that Q∗ > Q◦.
On the other hand, if E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≥ G′[R◦(P )], then G′[R◦(P˜ )] is negatively correlated
with P˜ . Introducing regret aversion to the firm makes the firm raise more concerns about
the disutility from the discrepancy of its output level, Q◦ − Q(P ), when low realizations
of P˜ are revealed. To minimize regret, the regret-averse firm optimally adjusts its output
level downward from Q◦ so that Q∗ < Q◦.
We now resume the original case that the firm is both risk averse and regret averse,
i.e., U ′′(Π) < 0 and G′′(R) > 0. Differentiating the objective function of program (5) with
respect to Q, and evaluating the resulting derivative at Q = Q◦ yields
E{Ψ(P˜ )[P˜ − E(P˜ )]} = Cov[Ψ(P˜ ), P˜ ], (11)
where Ψ(P ) = U ′[Π◦(P )] + βG′[R◦(P )] and we have used the fact that C ′(Q◦) = E(P˜ ). It
then follows from Eqs. (6) and (7) that Q∗ > (<) Q◦ if, and only if, the covariance term
on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) is positive (negative). We state and prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. If U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, the regret-averse competitive firm increases
or decreases its optimal output level, i.e., Q∗ is greater or smaller than Q◦, when the per-
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unit price becomes uncertain, depending on whether E[Ψ(P˜ )] is no less than Ψ(P ) or Ψ(P ),
respectively.
Proof. Note that
Ψ′(P ) = U ′′[Π◦(P )]Q◦ + βG′′[R◦(P )][Q(P )−Q◦], (12)
and
Ψ′′(P ) = U ′′′[Π◦(P )]Q◦2 + βG′′′[R◦(P )][Q(P )−Q◦]2 + βG′′[R◦(P )]Q′(P ). (13)
Since Q(P ) < (>) Q◦ for all P < (>) E(P˜ ), Eq. (12) implies that Ψ′(P ) < 0 for all
P ≤ E(P˜ ). Since U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, Eq. (13) implies that Ψ′′(P ) > 0 for all
P ∈ [P , P ]. By Jensen’s inequality, we have E[Ψ(P˜ )] > Ψ[E(P˜ )]. If E[Ψ(P˜ )] ≥ Ψ(P ), there
must exist a unique per-unit price, P ◦ ∈ (E(P˜ ), P ), such that Ψ(P ◦) = E[Ψ(P˜ )]. Since
Ψ(P ) is convex and E[Ψ(P˜ )] ≥ Ψ(P ), it follows that Ψ(P ) < E[Ψ(P˜ )] for all P ∈ (P , P ◦)
and Ψ(P ) > E[Ψ(P˜ )] for all P ∈ (P ◦, P ]. Hence, we have
Cov[Ψ(P˜ ), P˜ ] = E
{
{Ψ(P˜ )− E[Ψ(P˜ )]}(P˜ − P ◦)
}
> 0. (14)
Eq. (14) then implies that Q∗ > Q◦. The proof that Q∗ < Q◦ if E[Ψ(P˜ )] ≥ Ψ(P ) can be
done analogously and thus is omitted. 2
The sufficient condition for Q∗ > Q◦, i.e., E[Ψ(P˜ )] ≥ Ψ(P ), can be written as
β
{
E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]−G′[R◦(P )]}
}
≥ U ′[Π◦(P )]− E{U ′[Π◦(P˜ )]}. (15)
The right-hand side of condition (15) is positive since U ′′(Π) < 0. Condition (15) never
holds for all β > 0 if E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≤ G′[R◦(P )]. In this case, we cannot unambiguously
compare Q∗ with Q◦. For condition (15) to hold, we need E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} > G′[R◦(P )] and
β ≥ U
′[Π◦(P )]− E{U ′[Π◦(P˜ )]}
E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} −G′[R◦(P )] > 0. (16)
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Given that E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} > G′[R◦(P )], Proposition 1 implies that the regret-averse firm
has an incentive to produce beyond Q◦ should the firm be risk neutral. Since the firm is
in fact risk averse, there is a countervailing incentive that induces the firm to reduce its
output level when the per-unit price becomes uncertain. Condition (16) simply says that
the firm is sufficiently regret averse, i.e., β is sufficiently large, in that the incentive driven
by regret aversion dominates the opposing incentive driven by risk aversion. The firm as
such optimally produces more upon introducing the price uncertainty.
The sufficient condition for Q∗ < Q◦, i.e., E[Ψ(P˜ )] ≥ Ψ(P ), can be written as
β
{
G′[R◦(P )]− E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]}
}
≤ E{U ′[Π◦(P˜ )]} − U ′[Π◦(P )]. (17)
The right-hand side of condition (17) is positive since U ′′(Π) < 0. Condition (17) holds for
all β > 0 if E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≥ G′[R◦(P )]. Given that E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≥ G′[R◦(P )], Proposition
1 implies that the regret-averse firm has an incentive to produce below Q◦ should the firm
be risk neutral. Since the firm is in fact risk averse, there is a reinforcing incentive that
induces the firm to reduce its output level when the price uncertainty prevails. For all
β > 0, the firm optimally produces less when the per-unit price becomes uncertain.
If E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} < G′[R◦(P )], condition (17) reduces to β ≤ β1, where
β1 =
E{U ′[Π◦(P˜ )]} − U ′[Π◦(P )]
G′[R◦(P )]− E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} > 0. (18)
Given that E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} < G′[R◦(P )], the results of Proposition 1 are not applicable so that
the incentive driven by regret aversion is ambiguous. However, if the firm is not too regret
averse in that β ≤ β1, the incentive driven by risk aversion to reduce output in response to
the presence of price uncertainty becomes the dominant factor, thereby rendering Q∗ < Q◦.
Wong (2014) derives a sufficient condition for Q∗ < Q◦, which requires β ≤ β2 if
U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, where
β2 =
U ′{Π◦[E(P˜ )]} − U ′[Π◦(P )]
G′[R◦(P )]−G′(0) > 0, (19)
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and G′(0) = G′{R◦[E(P˜ )]}. Niu et al. (2014) derive an alternative sufficient condition for
Q∗ < Q◦, which requires β ≤ β3 if U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, where
β3 = − U
′′[Π◦(P )]Q◦
G′′[R◦(P )][Q(P )−Q◦] . (20)
Since U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0, we have
U ′′[Π◦(P )] ≥ U
′{Π◦[E(P˜ )]} − U ′[Π◦(P )]
Π◦[E(P˜ )]} −Π◦(P ) . (21)
Since Π◦(P )−Π◦[E(P˜ )] = [P − E(P˜ )]Q◦, we can write inequality (21) as
−U ′′[Π◦(P )]Q◦ ≤ U
′{Π◦[E(P˜ )]} − U ′[Π◦(P )]
P − E(P˜ ) . (22)
Since G′′′(R) ≥ 0 and G′(0) = G′{R◦[E(P˜ )]}, we have
G′[R◦(P )]−G′(0)
P − E(P˜ ) ≤
∂G′[R◦(P )]
∂P
∣∣∣∣
P=P
= G′′[R◦(P )][Q(P )−Q◦]. (23)
It then follows from inequalities (22) and (23) that β3 ≤ β2.
If E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} ≥ G′[R◦(P )], we show that Q∗ < Q◦ for all β > 0. On the other hand,
if E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} < G′[R◦(P )], we show that Q∗ < Q◦ for all β ≤ β1. Since U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0,
we have E{U ′[Π◦(P˜ )]} ≥ U ′{Π◦[E(P˜ )]}. Since G′′(R) > 0, we have E{G′[R◦(P˜ )]} > G′(0).
It then follows from Eqs. (18) and (19) that β1 > β2. Hence, our sufficient conditions are
implied by that of Broll et al. (2016), but not vice versa. In other words, our sufficient
conditions are more general.
4. The marginal effect of price uncertainty
In this section, we examine the marginal effect of changes in price uncertainty on pro-
duction when regret aversion prevails. To this end, we let Fˆ (P ) be a new CDF of P˜ . When
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the original CDF, F (P ), is replaced by the new CDF, Fˆ (P ), the first-order condition for
program (5) becomes
∫ P
P
{U ′[Π†(P )] + βG′[R†(P )]}[P − C ′(Q†)]dFˆ (P ) = 0, (24)
where a dagger (†) signifies an optimal level. To compare Q† with Q∗, we evaluate the
left-hand side of Eq. (24) at Q∗ to yield
∫ P
P
{U ′[Π∗(P )] + βG′[R∗(P )]}[P − C ′(Q∗)]dFˆ (P )
=
∫ P
P
{U ′[Π∗(P )] + βG′[R∗(P )]}[P − C ′(Q∗)]d[Fˆ (P )− F (P )], (25)
where the equality follows from Eq. (6). It then follows from Eqs. (7) and (24) that
Q† > (<) Q∗ if, and only if, the right-hand side of Eq. (25) is positive (negative).
We first consider the case wherein Fˆ (P ) is riskier than F (P ) in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance (FSD), i.e., Fˆ (P ) ≥ F (P ) for all P ∈ [P , P ], with strict inequality at
some P . We state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. When the uncertain per-unit price, P˜ , experiences an increase in risk
via a FSD shift from F (P ) to Fˆ (P ), the regret-averse competitive firm reduces its optimal
output level, i.e., Q† < Q∗, if the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion does not exceed
unity, i.e., −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0.
Proof. Let Φ(P ) = {U ′[Π∗(P )] + βG′[R∗(P )]}[P − C ′(Q∗)]. Then, we have
Φ′(P ) = U ′′[Π∗(P )][C(Q∗)− C ′(Q∗)Q∗] + U ′[Π∗(P )]
{
1 + Π∗(P )
U ′′[Π∗(P )]
U ′[Π∗(P )]
}
+βG′′[R∗(P )][Q(P )−Q∗][P − C ′(Q∗)] + βG′[R∗(P )]. (26)
Since C ′′(Q) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0, the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (26) is
positive. Given that −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0, the second term is also positive.
Theory of Regret 11
Since Q′(P ) > 0, we have Q(P ) < (>) Q∗ whenever P < (>) C ′(Q∗). The third term on
the right-hand side of Eq. (26) is positive so that Φ′(P ) > 0. Using Φ(P ), we can write the
right-hand side of Eq. (25) as
∫ P
P
Φ(P )d[Fˆ (P )− F (P )] = −
∫ P
P
Φ′(P )[Fˆ (P )− F (P )]dP < 0. (27)
where the equality follows from integration by parts, and the inequality follows from the
fact that Fˆ (P ) ≥ F (P ) for all P ∈ [P , P ], with strict inequality at some P . Hence, we
conclude from Eq. (27) that Q† < Q∗. 2
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. Since there is a FSD shift from the orig-
inal CDF, F (P ), to the new CDF, Fˆ (P ), the realizations of P˜ close to P are now much
more likely to be seen than those close to P . The regret-averse firm as such raises more
concerns about the disutility from the discrepancy of its output level, Q∗ − Q(P ), when
low realizations of P˜ are revealed given the FSD shift from F (P ) to Fˆ (P ). To minimize
regret, the firm optimally adjusts its output level downward from Q∗. The FSD shift from
F (P ) to Fˆ (P ), albeit reducing the expected per-unit price, has a side effect that induces
the risk-averse firm to raise its output level in order to better stabilize its marginal utility,
U ′[Π∗(P˜ )]. Since the elasticity of the firm’s marginal utility is gauged by the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), the firm’s marginal utility would be insensitive to
changes in profit when −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0. In this case, risk aversion also
induces the firm to produce less so that Q† < Q∗.
Since Q′(P ) > 0, there must exist a unique per-unit price, P ∗ ∈ (P , P ), at which
Q(P ∗) = Q∗, i.e., P ∗ = C ′(Q∗). The following definition is adopted from the definition of
downside risk a` la Menezes et al. (1980).4
4An increase in downside risk in the sense of Menezes et al. (1980) is simply a third-degree increase in
risk in the sense of Ekern (1980).
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Definition 1. The CDF, Fˆ (P ), is said to have more simple positive (negative) skewness
than the CDF, F (P ), if, and only if,
∫ P
P
[Fˆ (P )− F (P )]dP = 0, (28)
∫ P
P
{∫ P
P
[Fˆ (x)− F (x)]dx
}
dP = 0, (29)
∫ P
P
[Fˆ (x)− F (x)]dx ≤ (≥) 0 for all P ≤ P ∗, (30)
∫ P
P
[Fˆ (x)− F (x)]dx ≥ (≤) 0 for all P ≥ P ∗, (31)
and
∫ P
P
{∫ x
P
[Fˆ (y)− F (y)]dy
}
dx ≤ (≥) 0 for all P ∈ [P , P ]. (32)
Eq. (28) ensures that P˜ has the same mean under F (P ) and Fˆ (P ). Eq. (29) ensures
that P˜ has the same variance, denoted by σ2, under F (P ) and Fˆ (P ). Eq. (32) ensures that
P˜ has more positive (negative) skewness under Fˆ (P ) than under F (P ), while Eqs. (30) and
(31) ensure a single-crossing property. To see this, we compare the central third moment
under Fˆ (P ) and that under F (P ):
∫ P
P
[
P − E(P˜ )
σ
]3
d[Fˆ (P )− F (P )]
=
6
σ3
∫ P
P
[P − E(P˜ )]
{∫ P
P
[Fˆ (x)− F (x)]dx
}
dP
=
6
σ3
∫ P
P
(P − P ∗)
{∫ P
P
[Fˆ (x)− F (x)]dx
}
dP
= − 6
σ3
∫ P
P
{∫ P
P
{∫ x
P
[Fˆ (y)− F (y)]dy
}
dx
}
dP, (33)
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where the first equality follows from integration by parts and Eq. (28), the second equality
follows from Eq. (29), and the last equality follows from integration by parts and Eq. (29).
If Fˆ (P ) has more simple positive (negative) skewness than F (P ), the right-hand side of Eq.
(33) is positive (negative) so that the third central moment under Fˆ (P ) is indeed larger
(smaller) than that under F (P ).
We state and prove our final proposition.
Proposition 4. If U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, the regret-averse competitive firm increases
(decreases) its optimal output level, i.e., Q† > (<) Q∗, when the CDF of the uncertain per-
unit price, P˜ , shifts from F (P ) to Fˆ (P ), where Fˆ (P ) has more simple positive (negative)
skewness than F (P ).
Proof. Let Φ(P ) = {U ′[Π∗(P )] + βG′[R∗(P )]}(P − P ∗). Then, we have Φ′′(P ) = H(P ) +
+2U ′′[Π∗(P )]Q∗, where
H(P ) = U ′′′[Π∗(P )]Q∗2(P − P ∗) + βG′′′[R∗(P )][Q(P )−Q∗]2(P − P ∗)
+βG′′[R∗(P )](P − P ∗)Q′(P ) + 2βG′′[R∗(P )][Q(P )−Q∗]. (34)
Since Q(P ) < (>) Q∗ whenever P < (>) P ∗ and Q′(P ) > 0, Eq. (34) implies that
H(P ) < (>) 0 whenever P < (>) P ∗. Using Φ(P ), we can write the right-hand side of Eq.
(25) as
∫ P
P
Φ(P )d[F (P )− F ◦(P )]
=
∫ P
P
{H(P ) + 2U ′′[Π∗(P )]Q∗}
{∫ P
P
[F (x)− F ◦(x)]dx
}
dP
=
∫ P
P
H(P )
{∫ P
P
[F (x)− F ◦(x)]dx
}
dP
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−2Q∗2
∫ P
P
U ′′′[Π∗(P )]
{∫ P
P
{∫ x
P
[Fˆ (y)− F (y)]dy
}
dx
}
dP, (35)
where the first equality follows from integration by parts and Eq. (28), and the second
equality follows from integration by parts and Eq. (29). Since H(P ) < (>) 0 whenever
P < (>) P ∗, Eqs. (30) and (31) imply that the first term on the right-hand side of Eq.
(35) is positive (negative). Eq. (32) implies that the second term on the right-hand side
of Eq. (35) is also positive (negative). Hence, we conclude that Q† > (<) Q∗ if Fˆ (P ) has
more simple positive (negative) skewness than F (P ). 2
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows. When Fˆ (P ) has more simple positive
skewness than F (P ), realizations of P˜ close to P are much less likely to be seen than those
close to P . The regret-averse firm as such raises more concerns about the disutility from
the discrepancy of its output level, Q(P )−Q∗, when high realizations of P˜ are revealed. To
minimize regret, the regret-averse firm optimally adjusts its output level upward from Q∗.
Prudence, i.e., U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0, further reinforces the firm’s preferences for positive skewness
and thus Q† > Q∗. On the other hand, when Fˆ (P ) has more simple negative skewness
than F (P ), realizations of P˜ close to P are much more likely to be seen than those close to
P . The regret-averse firm as such optimally adjusts its output level downward from Q∗ to
reduce the discrepancy of its output level, Q∗−Q(P ), when low output prices are revealed.
Prudence implies that the firm would like to minimize its exposure to negative skewness
and thus Q† < Q∗.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we revisit a model of the regret-averse competitive firm under price uncer-
tainty. The firm’s regret-averse preferences are characterized by a bivariate utility function
that includes additive separable disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alter-
natives. The extent of regret is gauged by the difference between the actual profit and
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the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production decision had the firm ob-
served the true realized output price. We show that the global and marginal effects of price
uncertainty on production are both positive (negative) when regret aversion prevails if the
random output price is positively (negatively) skewed. In this case, high (low) output prices
are much more likely to be seen than low (high) output prices. As such, the regret-averse
firm is induced to raise (lower) its output optimal level.
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